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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: A research paper that seeks to stimulate debates about 
contemporary auditing practices.  
Approach: The paper builds a generalised theory of auditing to pose some 
questions about the basic auditing model, notions of audit quality and the 
possibility that some transactions cannot be audited in the traditional way. 
Findings: It is argued that the basic auditing model is flawed since it makes 
auditors financially dependent on companies. The conventional approach to 
‘audit quality’ is also incomplete as it pays little attention to the organisational 
and social context of auditing. It also argues that as companies have 
diversified into new forms of investment and complex financial instruments, 
some transactions may be not be capable of being audited in the traditional 
way. 
Research limitations: The paper does not offer a comprehensive critique of 
contemporary auditing issues. Rather is a focus on some selected issues.  
Practical implications: The paper encourages reflections on contemporary 
practices and offers some suggestions for reforms.  
Originality: The paper is a combination of theory, evidence and speculation 
on contemporary issues. 
Keywords: Auditing model, Auditor independence, Audit quality, Banks, 
Agency theory, Finance capitalism. 
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Introduction 
 
In market societies, people routinely have to transact with faceless 
corporations about whom they have little personal knowledge. In such 
societies, external auditing is promoted as a trust engendering technology 
with a capacity to promote a particular kind of social order (Power, 1999). It is 
actively promoted by the state and not only corporations, but significant non-
corporate entities are also required by law (e.g. UK Companies Acts) to 
embrace such technologies. However, confidence in corporate auditing and 
auditor claims of being able to construct an objective state of the financial 
affairs of business enterprises are routinely undermined by unexpected 
corporate collapses, frauds, financial scandals and general crisis of 
capitalism. At such times, the state, accountancy trade associations and 
significant others seek to reconstruct confidence in auditing by tweaking 
institutional structures, regulatory apparatuses, codes of ethics and 
disciplinary arrangements for errant auditors (Sikka and Willmott, 1995).  
 
Following revelations of frauds and collapse of US giants Enron and 
WorldCom, the usual flurry of political activity enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 (for a critique see Burrowes et al., 2004), which sought to strengthen 
auditor independence by introducing some restraints on the auditor’s ability to 
sell consultancy services to audit clients1. It also created the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB); an organisation specifically charged 
with oversight of the auditors auditing US public companies. In the UK, to 
shore up public confidence in auditor independence, the Auditing Practices 
Board issued revised ethical standards (Auditing Practices Board, 2004a). 
The role of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the main regulators 
responsible for accounting and auditing regulation, and its various arms, was 
strengthened. In particular, an Audit Inspection Unit2 (AIU) was formed for 
                                                 
1 These include prohibition of the provision of book-keeping, financial information 
systems design and implementation, appraisal or valuation services, actuarial 
services, internal audit outsourcing, performing management functions, human 
resource services, brokerage and investment services, legal services and advocating 
client’s interests in litigation. 
2  For further information see http://www.frc.org.uk/pob/ 
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monitoring of the audits of all listed and other major public companies. The 
Companies Act 2006 beefed up auditor rights and powers in relation to 
information from employees, officers, directors and subsidiaries.  At the same 
time issues about the efficacy of the basic auditing model, accountability and 
governance of auditing firms, the auditability of global businesses and some 
emerging assets (e.g. complex financial instruments) received scant attention 
(Sikka, 2004).  
 
Since late 2007, major western economies have experienced a deepening 
banking and financial crisis arising from subprime lending practices by banks, 
which in turn has restricted the availability of credit  and has led to what has 
come to be described as a ‘credit crunch’. The full extent of the crisis is still 
unfolding, but regulators have stated that off balance sheet accounting 
practices have been rife (Daily Telegraph, 20 December 2007; International 
Herald Tribune, 28 February 2008). Experts believe that many banks have 
been showing bad debts and investments as good and as a result may have 
to write-off some US$1.2 trillion3. Some banks and financial institutions have 
collapsed within a short period of receiving unqualified audit opinions (UK 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008; United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District Delaware, 2008). Central banks have been pumped vast 
amounts of money to bailout distressed banks and provide much needed 
liquidity to stave off bank collapses and the crisis from spreading to insurance, 
property and other adjacent markets. Amidst the crisis, attention has focused 
on the role of auditors because of a deeply held view that “a green light from 
an auditor means that a company’s accounting practices have passed muster 
… [Analysts] say that auditors, because of in-depth knowledge of complex 
accounting rules and first-hand relationships with corporate management, are 
there to push back, examining how executives calculate numbers and 
assessing the financial health of enterprises.” (New York Times, 13 April 
20084). Past experience (Sikka and Willmott, 1995) suggests that the 
accounting industry will seek to manage the crisis by revising 
                                                 
3 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7313637.stm 
4http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/business/13audit.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 
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accounting/auditing standards and ethical codes5 rather than undertaking 
major reforms. 
 
A comprehensive critique of the politics and problems of auditing is beyond 
the scope of the present paper. However it seeks to encourage debate by 
focusing on three issues, which are deeply embedded within the current 
auditing practices. These relate to the appropriateness of the basic auditing 
model, quality of audits and verifiability of financial statements. The auditing 
model, it is argued, is fundamentally flawed as it makes auditors’ financially 
dependent upon companies and persuades them to prioritise their own 
economic interests at the expense of other parties which may have an interest 
in audits. In professional circles, audit quality is frequently associated with 
using appropriate techniques. Such a focus neglects the organisational and 
social context of auditing and thus little attention is paid to how audits are 
manufactured, or the incentives to auditors to produce good audits. 
Traditionally auditors have conducted ex-post audits and the main objective 
has been to verify income, expenses, assets and liabilities, which have 
generally been the outcome of past transactions. However, the intensification 
of finance capitalism has produced new complex financial instruments whose 
value is dependent on uncertain future events and market volatility. It is 
doubtful that auditors have the requisite expertise to deal with the challenges 
posed by shifts in capitalism. 
 
To address the above issues, the paper is organised into three further 
sections. The next section offers some perspectives on company auditing. In 
particular, it argues that theories supporting the need for external auditing 
expect auditors to be independent of the company and its directors. Auditors 
are also expected to have pressures and incentives to deliver good quality 
audits. The second section addresses three themes outlined above. Firstly, it 
provides some evidence to support the argument that due to flaws in the basic 
                                                 
5 US “Board [PCAOB] Adopts New Ethics and Independence Rule Concerning 
Communications with Audit Committees and an Amendment to its Existing Tax 
Services Rule”, PCAOB press release, 22 April 2008 
(http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/News/2008/04-22.aspx). 
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auditing models auditors have become financially dependent on companies 
and cannot deliver independent audits. Secondly, it argues that the 
association of audit quality with techniques neglects the organisational and 
social context of auditing. Some evidence is provided to argue that current 
practices are unlikely to result in good audits. Thirdly, it is argued that the 
traditional approaches to auditing may not be appropriate for dealing with the 
consequences of finance capitalism, especially as they thrive on future prices 
and market volatility. Therefore, it is doubtful that the resulting financial 
statements can be audited in any objective way. The third section concludes 
the paper by a summary and discussion of the issues raised. It also sketches 
out some possible reforms. 
 
Perspectives on Company Audits 
 
Agency theory is frequently mobilised to explain the rationale behind company 
audits (Benston, 1985; Arnold and de Lange, 2004). The theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) is concerned with control and asymmetry of information 
between the principal (shareholders) and agents (directors). Within the 
contemporary context of a separation of ownership and control, it is assumed 
that shareholders have delegated wealth to directors with instructions to 
maximise shareholder wealth. The successful achievement of this objective 
secures financial rewards for directors. However, directors can maximise their 
personal welfare at the expense of shareholders by presenting optimistic or 
even misleading financial statements. Since the agent or directors have 
control of information and their activities are not easily observable by 
shareholders, we have a classic moral hazard problem i.e. shareholder does 
not know the honesty and objectivity of the accounts presented. Within the 
agency framework, the conflict between principal and agent is managed 
through a variety of incentives, bonding and monitoring arrangements. One of 
these is to require companies and their directors to submit to an annual audit 
by expert auditors who are independent of the agents and able to construct an 
objective state of corporate affairs. In principles, such audits could be 
conducted by shareholders, but they may not have the necessary expertise. 
Therefore, shareholders seek to hire expert labour in the guise of independent 
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auditors. The auditors, it is argued, have incentives to behave honourably 
because misbehaviour can erode their reputational capital and capacity to 
earn economic rents. Typically, the auditors are constrained by a variety of 
liability arrangements which can impose substantial penalties upon them 
(Benston, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983).  
 
Agency theory does not offer guidance on what an ‘expert’ is and how claims 
of expertise are enacted since these are shaped by broader social power and 
politics. It s widely acknowledged that through a variety of strategies 
accountants have mobilised the state to advance their credentials as experts 
and secure control of the external auditing jurisdiction (Larson, 1977; 
Johnson, 1982; Robson and Cooper, 1990). As independent experts, auditors 
claim to be able to mediate uncertainty and construct an objective account of 
business affairs to enable shareholders and significant others to manage 
risks. This construction of reality is legitimised by appeals to a variety of 
standards, benchmarks, techniques and bodies of knowledge, but such claims 
are precarious as they are routinely undermined by periodic scandals, crisis, 
frauds, emergence of new technologies, patterns of trade and changes in 
capitalist economies. 
 
The above model of auditing is legitimised by the state and legislation (e.g. 
UK Companies Acts) requires all companies of significant size to submit to 
compulsory annual audits and publish audited accounts. This model is also 
exported from western to non-western countries (Bakre, 2005; Dedoulis and 
Caramanis, 2007). Agency theory whilst useful in explaining the rationale for 
external auditing does not explain how auditors might be appointed. In 
contemporary societies, individual shareholders are too diverse and rarely 
have the time or the inclination to directly recruit auditors.  In any case, there 
is little public information about auditing firms, their mode of work, audit 
contract, composition of audit teams and relationship with directors, to enable 
informed choices to be made. Managers of institutional investors are more 
focused on securing a return on their investment because their own 
performance is judged by this measure. They are more likely to churn markets 
rather than become directly involved in selection and surveillance of auditors. 
 8
In common with tax, customs, health and safety, hygiene, immigration and 
other inspectors, company auditors could be appointed by the state, but the 
dominant neoliberal ideology limits its role in the economic sphere (Harvey, 
2005). Under such circumstances, companies, in effect company directors, 
search and select auditors though their final appointment may be rubber-
stamped by shareholders at annual general meetings. There is a concern that 
directors may shop for audit opinions and prefer to hire more compliant 
auditors (Lennox, 2000).  
 
In market societies, auditors are remunerated by the client company rather 
than by an independent body. This, inevitably, makes them dependent upon 
directors for their fees and profits. Auditing firms may legitimise their status by 
appealing to ‘professionalism’, but in common with other capitalist enterprises 
they seek to increase profits and market share. As  Hanlon (1994) notes, 
within major accounting firms the “emphasis is very firmly on being 
commercial and on performing a service for the customer rather than on being 
public spirited on behalf of either the public or the state” (p. 150).  Auditing 
firms have used their control of the auditing markets to colonise adjacent 
markets to sell consultancy services to audit clients. The profit motive informs 
the dynamics of accounting firms. As a partner of a major accountancy firm 
put it, “a firm like ours is a commercial organization and the bottom line is that 
…... first of all the individual must contribute to the profitability of the business. 
In part that is bringing in business but essentially profitability is based upon 
the ability to serve existing clients well” (Hanlon, 1994, p. 121). In essence, 
the auditing model requires one set of entrepreneurs (auditors) to watch over 
another set of entrepreneurs (directors). The success of both is measured by 
revenues, profits and market shares rather than by pursuit of any broader 
social goals.  
 
The commercialisation of audits produces fault-lines. It makes auditors 
dependent upon company directors for their fees and as a result they may not 
be able to retain sufficient distance to deliver independent audits. They may 
also develop strategies that maximise auditor profits, possibly by performing 
less stringent audits or by developing strategies which increase private profits 
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but reduce audit quality. The quality of audits is dependent not only on the 
technical skills of audit teams, but also on organisational values and labour 
processes embedded within auditing firms. Firms may train and educate their 
staff, but there is no guarantee that staff will necessarily subscribe to the 
values and pressures imposed upon them. Within the agency theory 
framework, such tendencies can be checked by a variety of incentives and 
pressures, including stringent liability arrangements. However, the extent of 
liability arrangements depends on power and politics. Auditing firms have 
incentives to mobilise their resources to dilute liability, especially as the 
arrangements can have significant effects on their profits. An examination of 
the social and organisational context of auditing should be a key element of 
any exploration of audit quality, but this is rarely the case.  
 
In capitalist societies, all economic surpluses need to be accounted, allocated 
and distributed to the absent capitalists. In this context, auditing processes 
‘watch over capital’, checking and controlling the processes associated with 
the enlargement of capital (Johnson, 1982). Such processes require constant 
vigilance, especially as capitalism mutates. In the era of mercantilism and 
industrial capitalism, auditors developed technologies for ex-post verification 
of financial statements that primarily relied upon past transactions to verify 
income, expenses, assets, liabilities and other components of financial 
statements. However, the shift to finance capitalism poses numerous 
challenges as property rights and profits are derived from intellectual property, 
speculation and complex financial instruments whose value is dependent 
upon future market volatility. In a globalised economy, money itself is valued 
as a commodity and bears little relationship to the real economy. Due to 
technological changes money can almost instantaneously roam the world. 
The changes in the nature of capitalism pose new challenges to the value of 
ex-post audits and traditional auditing technologies. Yet the broader social 
context of auditing does not form any part of auditing education (Sikka et al., 
2007) or the regulatory reports (PCAOB, 2007a, 2007b,2007c, 2007d). 
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AUDITING PRACTICES 
 
This section engages with three key issues: flaws in the current auditing 
model which make auditors financially dependent upon companies; the 
neglect of organisational and social context of auditing in discussions of audit 
quality; and some challenges posed by intensification of finance capitalism. 
 
The Auditing Model 
 
The contemporary auditing model makes auditors dependent on companies 
and their directors for fees and profits. As a result, auditors may become too 
subservient to directors and even ‘bend the rules’ to accommodate directors 
(Sikka, 2008a). One commentator noted that “In the Enron debacle, one of the 
most disturbing disclosures was that Arthur Andersen’s technical accounting 
experts were overruled by the engagement partners in Houston, allowing 
accounting decisions to be approved even though Andersen’s experts knew 
they were wrong” (New York Times, 26 March 20086; also see Powers Jr. et 
al., 2002). Such concerns have again been given visibility at New Century 
Financial Corporation, the second largest originator of sub-prime residential 
mortgage loans in the US, which collapsed in early 2007 (United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District Delaware, 2008). The court appointed 
insolvency examiner’s report drew attention to the perennial concerns about 
auditor closeness to clients. The report (p. 9) stated that  
 
“KPMG's [audit] engagement team acquiesced in New Century's 
departures from prescribed accounting methodologies and often 
resisted or ignored valid recommendations from specialists within 
KPMG. At times, the engagement team acted more as advocates for 
New Century, even when its practices were questioned by KPMG 
specialists who had greater knowledge of relevant accounting 
guidelines and industry practice. When one KPMG specialist persisted 
in objecting to a particular accounting practice ... an objection that was 
well founded and later led to a change in the Company's practice - the 
lead KPMG engagement partner told him in an email: "I am very 
disappointed we are still discussing this. As far as I am concerned we 
are done. The client thinks we are done. All we are going to do is piss 
everybody off".  
                                                 
6 http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/when-auditors-cave/ 
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In 2006, three auditors from the Japanese firm of ChuoAoyama 
PricewaterhouseCoopers were given a suspended prison sentence for their 
role in accounting fraud at Kanebo Limited, a major cosmetics and textiles 
company. In 2004, the company admitted to falsifying financial statements for 
the previous five years and inflating its earnings by around 200 billion yen 
(US$1.37 billion; £723 million). For 2002, the company reported net assets of 
926 million yen ($7.9 billion) but actually was over 80 billion yen in debt. Three 
auditors helped the company to meet its targets by helping directors to falsify 
earnings of 200 billions yen. They not only turned a blind eye to the falsified 
books and certified them, but also worked with the Kanebo executives to 
produce false consolidated financial statements to cover-up losses7 (BBC 
News, 29 July 20058; The Japan Times, 2 September 20069; Accountancy 
Age, 1 August 200710) 
 
The cosiness of auditor-client relationship has also been documented in other 
episodes. For example, a UK government report (UK Department of Trade 
and Industry, 2001) on the frauds perpetrated by the late tycoon Robert 
Maxwell (RM) at his business empire drew attention to an audit strategy 
memo written by the audit partner of Coopers & Lybrand (now part of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers). It told audit staff (p. 62) that  
 
"The first requirement is to continue to be at the beck and call of RM, 
his sons and his staff, appear when wanted and provide whatever is 
requested. The second requirement is … to continue to avoid making 
errors in exceptionally difficult and exceptionally demanding 
circumstances".  
 
The report concluded that auditors  
 
“consistently agreed accounting treatments of transactions that served 
the interest of RM and not those of the trustees or the beneficiaries of 
                                                 
7 In June 2006, Japanese regulators ordered ChuoAoyama PricewaterhouseCoopers 
to suspend part of its statutory auditing services for two months. Subsequently, the 
firm changed its name but many clients deserted and it was forced to fold its 
operations (Sikka, 2008a). 
8 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4727691.stm 
9 http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20060902a1.html 
10 http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2195394/misuzu-
operations-formally-halt 
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the pension scheme, provided it could be justified by an interpretation 
of the letter of the relevant standards or regulations” (p. 328) 
 
The consequences of fee dependency affect medium-size auditing firms too. 
Consider the case of Versailles Group Plc, a UK company initially listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), a junior stock exchange in London. The 
company specialised in the provision of trade finance and collapsed in 
December 1999 amidst allegations of fraud. In 2004 the company’s founder 
and chairman was convicted of fraud and sent to prison for six years11. 
Attention also focused on Messrs Nunn Hayward, a medium-size firm which 
had held the office of the auditor since the inception of the business in 1990. 
A disciplinary report by the UK accountancy profession (Joint Disciplinary 
Schemes, 2004) noted that  
 
“The financial statements of Versailles for the year ending 28th 
February 1996 were sent by Mr Clough, the Finance Director, to the 
shareholders, filed with AIM and approved by the shareholders at an 
AGM before Nunn Hayward had completed its audit.  Although Nunn 
Hayward question whether the audit certificate was false, in our 
judgment it plainly was because on its face it purported to have been 
provided by Nunn Hayward when in fact it had not been.  The point 
taken by Nunn Hayward is that when in fact they completed their audit 
work they did approve the financial statements in the form originally 
filed and bearing a purported audit certificate. Mr Clough informed Mr 
Dales12 that he had hoodwinked the Board into believing that the audit 
had been completed.  The matter was discussed between Nunn 
Hayward’s partners and they properly obtained advice from Solicitors 
Messrs Druces and Attlee who were informed by Mr Dales that the 
Finance Director had “done a wobbly”. This is to be contrasted with the 
admitted deliberate act of hoodwinking the Board. Messrs Druces and 
Attlee gave advice and referred to the auditors’ right of resignation but 
Mr Dales said that this was a big fee account and that his firm did not 
want to resign. The audit had not been completed earlier by Nunn 
Hayward because Versailles had been unable to provide access to 
basic documentation in spite of requests.  The actions of Mr Clough 
should have been regarded by competent auditors as a fundamental 
breach of trust.  Whereas Nunn Hayward did call for advice from 
Solicitors, Mr Dales and the firm seem to have accepted the view 
expressed by Versailles’s legally qualified Company Secretary that 
“although clearly there was a problem it was largely a technicality 
                                                 
11 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/southern_counties/3787901.stm; also see The 
Guardian, 26 May 2004. 
12 Thomas Peter Dales was the partner in-charge of the Versailles Audit. 
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provided that the audit could be completed without any adjustments 
being necessary to the accounts. In fact Nunn Hayward signed their 
audit certificate on unchanged financial statements after little further 
work.  Mr Nunn [another partner] carried out a “hot review”.  Although 
Druces & Attlee were advised by Nunn Hayward that Versailles were 
prepared to provide an indemnity and to circulate a notice with the 
papers for the necessary Extraordinary General Meeting explaining the 
circumstances and fully exonerating them, and although Druces & 
Attlee agreed a form of wording with Versailles, in fact no indemnity 
was provided and the final company circular for the AGM contained the 
words “due to an oversight” rather than the text agreed by Druce & 
Attlee “due to an oversight at the company”.  Thus shareholders never 
came close to being informed of the true situation, and Nunn Hayward 
adopted a craven attitude designed to minimise damage to Versailles” 
(Joint Disciplinary Scheme, 2004, paragraphs 50-53). 
 
Unlike employees, pension scheme members, unsecured creditors and other 
risk-bearers, shareholders have the statutory rights to question auditors at 
AGMs. They can use the opportunity to elicit information, but whether they get 
frank replies is another matter. Here is an extract from a UK government 
report (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1983) on the collapse of Ramor 
Investments Limited (formerly Bryanston Finance Limited), a secondary bank. 
The report (p. 283) contains the following letter written by a Price Waterhouse 
(now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers) partner in-charge of the audit to the 
company chairman. 
“Dear Mr. Smith, 
 
As arranged I am writing to let you know in advance of the Annual 
General Meeting on 26 July the replies I will give if I am asked by a 
shareholder for the reasons why my firm is not seeking re-election as 
auditors. If no questions are asked, then of course, no further 
information in addition to that contained in the Annual Report need be 
provided. 
 
However, if a shareholder asks further information I propose to reply as 
follows: 
 
“In recent years we have experienced certain difficulties in obtaining 
necessary information for our audit and being sure that all relevant 
explanations have been provided to us. In the final outcome we have 
been satisfied that we have received all such information and 
explanation; otherwise this would have been reflected in our audit 
report. However the situation created by these difficulties caused us to 
agree with the directors that we would not seek re-election at this 
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meeting, a step we are permitted to take under the provisions of the 
Companies Act.” 
 
If there should be a follow-up question asking for more information 
about the difficulties referred to in the foregoing statement I would 
propose to reply as follows: 
 
“There was no one matter which in itself caused us to reach this 
agreement with the directors. In view of this, there is nothing more that 
can be added to the answer that has already been given” 
 
I would not intend to give any more information nor to respond to any 
other question. 
 
Yours sincerely” 
 
The auditing model in practice is further complicated by the fact that auditors 
are permitted to sell consultancy services to their audit clients. This increases 
auditor fee dependency upon companies and can impair their perceived and 
actual independence (Briloff, 1990). Mautz and Sharaf (1961) argue that 
effective independent auditors must have “freedom from client control …be 
aware of the various pressures, some obvious and subtle, which tend to 
influence his attitude and thereby to erode slowly but surely his 
independence. … Non-auditing services result in an identification of the 
interests of auditors and their clients … (pp. 278-279).  Ever since the dawn of 
modern auditing, there have been concerns about the sale of non-auditing 
services to audit clients (Chandler and Edwards, 1994) and continue to be 
repeated (see Gwilliam, 1987 for a review, also see Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; 
Simunic, 1984; Powers Jr et al., 2002).  Such concerns have also been aired 
in critical reports published by the UK government. For example, a UK 
government report on the collapse of Roadships Limited concluded that  
 
"Independence is essential to enable auditors to retain their objectivity 
which enables their work to be relied upon by outsiders. It may be 
destroyed in many ways but significantly in three; firstly, by auditors 
having a financial interest in the company; secondly, by the auditors 
being controlled in the broadest sense by the company; and thirdly, if 
the work which is being done is in fact work which has been done 
previously by the auditors themselves acting as accountants … we do 
not accept that there can be the requisite degree of watchfulness 
where a man is checking his own figures or those a colleague ......... for 
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these reasons we do not believe that [the auditors] ever achieved the 
standards of independence necessary for a wholly objective audit" (UK 
Department of Trade and Industry, 1976, paras 243, 249 and 250). 
 
Another report (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1979) concluded that 
 
"in our view the principle of the auditor first compiling and then 
reporting upon a profit forecast is not considered to be a good practice 
for it may impair their ability to view the forecast objectively and must 
endanger the degree of independence essential to this work" (p. 271) 
 
The UK House of Commons Select Committee on Social Security 
recommended that pension fund auditors should not be allowed to carry out 
non-auditing services for their audit clients (Accountancy Age, 12 March 1992, 
p 1; Accountancy, April 1992, p 18). However, auditing industry has used its 
considerable financial and political resources to resist the imposition of a 
complete ban on the sale of consultancy services to auditing clients though 
some constraints have been imposed by professional and statutory rules 
(Sikka and Willmott, 1995; also see the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). The 
issues, however, continue to resurface. For example, following the bailout of 
Northern Rock, a UK bank, by the taxpayer, a parliamentary hearing (UK 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2008) examined the sale of non-
auditing services by auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers to the bank. The bank 
had relied upon wholesale money markets to fund its activities, but when the 
market worsened it came close to collapse and was bailed out by the state. 
The parliamentary reported concluded  
“We are also concerned that there appears to be a particular conflict of 
interest between the statutory role of the auditor, and the other work it 
may undertake for a financial institution. For example, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers received £700,000 in non-audit fees13 largely 
comprised of fees relating to assurance services in connection with 
Northern Rock’s actions in raising finance” (UK House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, 2008, p. 115). 
 
The Treasury Committee urged auditing regulators to consider the 
‘independence’ issues. An immediate response from the Auditing Practices 
Board, an organisation responsible for formulating ethical standards and 
                                                 
13 Auditors received £1.1 million for auditing and auditing related services. 
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dominated by major firms, was that it “had consulted widely on risk 
management and conflicts of interest, and received support from stakeholders 
for the UK’s principles-based approach. There was no appetite among 
stakeholders for US-style regulation14”.  
 
Even if professional and statutory rules are enacted to enhance auditor 
independence, firms have found the lure of profits too strong and have 
frequently violated the rules on auditor independence (see Sikka, 2008a for 
some evidence).  For example, the US arm of Ernst & Young (EY) had been 
fined and received reprimands for violation of US rules on auditor 
independence. Despite promises, it failed to improve compliance with the 
rules (Sikka, 2008a). Eventually, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) prosecuted because the firm entered into a business relationship with 
software giant PeopleSoft, one of its audit clients. In a withering court 
judgement, the judge stated that 
 
“The overwhelming evidence is that during the relevant period, EY’s 
day-to-day operations were profit-driven and ignored considerations of 
auditor independence in business relationships with PeopleSoft. EY’s 
partners shared in the pooled revenues of the firm’s three practice 
areas, and each EY partner was evaluated annually on his or her 
achievement toward five preset goals, one of which was sales. … EY 
committed repeated violations of the auditor independence standards 
by conduct that was reckless, highly unreasonable, and negligent. It 
has not acknowledged that it has committed any violations, and it has 
offered no assurance that it will not commit violations in the future.  … 
This was not a situation of an isolated mistake or confusion over a 
complicated, technical issue. These violations occurred over an 
extended period. They were committed by professionals throughout the 
firm who exhibited no caution or concern for the rules of auditor 
independence in connection with business relationships with an audit 
client. … the firm paid only perfunctory attention to the rules on auditor 
independence in business dealings with a client, and that EY reliance 
on a “culture of consulting” to achieve compliance with the rules on 
auditor independence was a sham. … EY partners acted recklessly 
and negligently in committing willful and deliberate violations of well 
established rules that govern auditor independence standards in 
connection with business relationships with an audit client. EY’s 
misconduct was blatant and occurred after the Commission and a court 
accepted EY’s representations that it would observe the very same 
                                                 
14 http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2208534/rock-rap-pwc-
mps-highlight-3786442 
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auditor independence rules …” (US Securities Exchange Commission, 
(2004).   
 
Ernst & Young were banned for six months from securing any new audit 
business in the US. 
 
Auditing firms have sought to defend their ability to sell consultancy services 
to audit clients by arguing that that they have devised organisational 
structures that separate consulting from auditing, commonly understood as 
‘Chinese walls’, and thus minimise potential conflicts of interests. A report by 
a US Senate Committee examining the sale of tax avoidance schemes by 
KPMG noted that the firm’s marketing strategies included  
 
“targeting its own audit clients for sales pitches … KPMG tax 
professionals were directed to contact existing clients about the 
product, including KPMG’s own audit clients ” (US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 4, 9). 
 
After examination of extensive evidence, the Senate Committee stated that  
 
“KPMG’s tax products also raise auditor independence issues. Three of 
the banks involved in BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS15 (Deutsche Bank, HVB, 
and Wachovia Bank), employ KPMG to audit their financial statements. 
SEC rules state that auditor independence is impaired when an auditor 
has a direct or material indirect business relationship with an audit 
client. KPMG apparently attempted to address the auditor 
independence issue by giving its clients a choice of banks to use in the 
transactions, including at least one bank that was not a KPMG audit 
client. It is unclear, however, whether individuals actually could choose 
what bank to use. Moreover, it is unclear how providing clients with a 
choice of banks alleviated KPMG’s conflict of interest, since it still had 
a direct or material, indirect business relationship with a bank whose 
financial statements were certified by KPMG auditors.  
 
A second set of auditor independence issues involves KPMG’s 
decision to market tax products to its own audit clients. By engaging in 
this marketing tactic, KPMG not only took advantage of its auditor-
client relationship, but also created a conflict of interest in those cases 
where it successfully sold a tax product to an audit client. The conflict 
of interest arises when the KPMG auditor reviewing the client’s 
financial statements is required, as part of that review, to examine the 
client’s tax return and its use of unusual tax strategies. In such 
situations, KPMG is, in effect, auditing its own work” (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 15-16). 
                                                 
15 These are acronyms for tax avoidance schemes. 
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The Senate Committee recommended that the newly formed “Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board should strengthen and finalize 
proposed rules restricting certain accounting firms from providing aggressive 
tax services to their audit clients, charging companies a contingent fee for 
providing tax services, and using aggressive marketing efforts to promote 
generic tax products to potential clients” (US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005, p. 8). 
 
Audit Quality 
 
There have been considerable concerns about quality, especially when 
companies experience unforeseen financial difficulties, or collapse soon after 
receiving unqualified audit reports (Mitchell et al., 1992; Edwards and Shaoul, 
1999; UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1976; 1979, 1983; 2001). A 
former President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) 
said, “All of the failures we looked into would have been found if anyone other 
than the audit junior had looked at the bank statements. ….. One public 
company failed with a £50 million black hole in one of its subsidiaries. The 
subsidiary had net assets of £5 million – and the auditors did not find it. If they 
had looked at the bank reconciliation, they would have raised so many 
enquiries they would have found the black hole. Big firms are no longer 
carrying out audits.  They audit in helicopters and circle clients from a few 
thousand feet and take pictures. No one gets out of the helicopter and kicks 
tyres. It’s no longer audit, it’s more akin to due diligence” (cited in Cousins et 
al., 2004, p. 14). In a survey, 54% of the Finance Directors of major UK 
companies felt that the quality of audits had declined noticeably. The views 
included, “The days when the auditors used to carry out stringent checks are 
well gone …. These days the auditors ask questions to the company 
accountant and accept their word ….. Audits try to avoid "dangerous" areas 
and have more opt-out clauses to put the onus on the management. Many are 
concerned about the use of audit as a means of getting into a company to sell 
other services” (Accountancy Age, 6 November 2003). 
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What counts as ‘quality’ in auditing is inevitably the outcome of power, politics 
and social relations (Power, 1999; 2003), but a dominant view is that ‘quality’ 
or objectivity is constructed by using appropriate auditing techniques and 
having a good set of working papers to demonstrate professional judgement 
(Auditing Practices Board, 2004b). This worldview is deeply embedded within 
institutions and a variety of auditing standards that require auditors to 
evaluate internal controls, conduct analytical reviews and make assessment 
of whether a business is a going concern. Such strategies lay claims to 
knowledge bases, equate quality with compliance with techniques and rules 
and portray auditors as experts who can mediate uncertainty and construct an 
objective state of business affairs. The technicist view of audit quality is 
further enforced by regulatory reports which list the failure of auditing firms to 
use prescribed techniques or adopt commonsensical steps (for example, see 
PCAOB, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d).  
 
Regulators pay little attention to social and organisational context of auditing. 
Little connection is made between the profit motive of accounting firms and 
how accountants are socialised in serving the clients (Anderson-Gough et al., 
2000). Company audits, in common with other products and services, are 
manufactured within a social and organisational setting, which naturalises 
worldviews and values and also have unanticipated outcomes. For example, 
audits are generally labour intensive and within firms there are pressures to 
increase profits. Individuals are subjected to performance appraisals and 
often their promotion and financial rewards depend on contribution to profits. 
Firms can increase profits by charging higher fess, but in a competitive market 
clients may be able to resist such moves. Firms might use more audit juniors 
or change the mix of junior and senior staff to reduce costs. An alternative is 
to squeeze time budgets and expect audit staff to work week-ends and 
evenings to complete the tasks. Firms may also undertake less stringent 
audits. A body of research (for example, see Willett and Page, 1996; Otley 
and Pierce, 1996; McNamara and Liyanarachchi, 2008) has consistently 
suggested that tight time budgets have dysfunctional effects on audits. Faced 
with inadequate time budgets, many audit staff admit to adopting irregular 
 20
practices, ignoring awkward and time-consuming items, falsification of audit 
work and what Otley and Pierce (1996) describe as “premature sign-off and 
other forms of audit quality reduction behaviour” (p. 46). The pressures to 
come under time budgets, may help to increase profits and mediate internal 
performance appraisals, but they also pose questions about the relationship 
between profit and audit quality.  
 
In principle, the pressures to dilute audit quality could be checked by stringent 
liability laws, but these have also been diluted in recent years. Traditionally, 
auditing firms have traded as partnerships with each partner having ‘joint and 
several’ liability (Napier, 1998). However, as corporate clients and accounting 
firms grew in size and significance, accountancy firms demanded and secured 
a series of liability concessions (for details see Cousins et al., 2004; Sikka, 
2008b). In the UK, these include the right to trade as limited liability 
companies and enabling companies to purchase insurance cover for auditors. 
The House of Lords’ judgement in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman & Others 
[1990] 1 All ER HL 568 stated that generally auditors owed a ‘duty of care’ to 
the company only (as a legal person) rather than to individual shareholders. 
The UK courts have also embraced the concept of ‘contributory negligence16’ 
to reduce redress against negligent auditors. A UK government inquiry noted 
that there is little or no “evidence suggesting that the courts in the UK have 
made, or are liable to make, excessive damages awards against auditors” 
(Office of Fair Trading, 2004, para. 1.2). However, following their US 
successes, auditing firms have secured further concessions in the UK as well. 
The Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 further diluted the principle of ‘joint 
and several’ liability and possibly reduced incentives for partners to police 
each other (Sikka, 2008b). In 1995, the US Private Securities Litigation 
                                                 
16 The principle was applied in the case of Barings PLC v Coopers & Lybrand [1997] 
1 BCLC 427; (In Barings plc (in liquidation) v Deloitte & Touche; Chancery Division 
11 June 2003. The court concluded that auditor negligence was “limited in extent and 
technical in nature”. Most of the losses due to fraud were attributed to 
mismanagement of Barings by its directors. In October 2003, Mr Justice Evans-
Lombe ruled that application of the principles set down in his judgment meant that 
Deloitte & Touche (Singapore) is liable for only approximately £1.5 million. The 
original claim brought by the liquidators, KPMG, was for £1.3 billion (also see 
Accountancy Age, 19 June 2003). 
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Reform Act enabled accountants and other professionals to negotiate a form 
of proportional liability and secure limits on their liability to shareholders. The 
UK Companies Act 2006 also followed suit and, subject to shareholder 
approval, auditors can negotiate financial limits on their liability with company 
directors. 
 
The dilution of auditor liability has been cited as a major factor for a number of 
US audit failures. According to Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist and 
senior Vice-President of the World Bank, “there are plenty of carrots 
encouraging accounting firms to look the other way … there had been one big 
stick discouraging them. If things went awry, they could be sued … In 1995, 
Congress adopted legislation intended to limit securities litigation … in doing 
so, they provided substantial [liability] protection for the auditors. But we may 
have gone too far: insulated from suits, the accountants are now willing to 
take more “gambles” … (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 136). Amidst the current banking 
and financial crisis, commentators have noted that court judgements and laws 
“have raised the bar for proving securities fraud and made it next to 
impossible for investors to sue parties like law and accounting firms that may 
have known or assisted in any shenanigans” (Business Week, 13 March 
200817). It is difficult to think of any economic theory or evidence that 
suggests that the raising of liability thresholds or shielding producers of goods 
and services from lawsuits somehow improves quality of goods and services. 
Nevertheless, auditing firms are now pursuing a ‘cap’ on liability (for example 
see, Accountancy Age, 27 October 2006; Financial Times, 3 October 2006; 
19 December 2007). 
 
Auditability 
Traditionally auditors have tended to verify financial statements by referring to 
a variety of evidence ranging from invoices, board minutes, contract notes, 
costing records and even market values. Such practices are increasingly 
problematised by transformations in capitalism where tangible things are 
                                                 
17 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_12/b4076000177741.htm 
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increasingly replaced by intellectual property (patents, logos, trademarks, 
copyrights, etc.) and complex financial instruments. Companies are keen to 
improve their reported performance by including such items in their financial 
statements, but in the absence of active markets it is almost impossible to 
verify the valuation of company specific intellectual property. Even greater 
challenges are being posed by instances where there are active markets.  
The 1990s are characterised by a major shift (in the Western world) from 
industrial capitalism to finance capitalism where money itself has become a 
commodity (Bello et al., 2000; Stiglitz, 2003; 2006; Morris, 2008; Soros, 
2008). Due to technological developments, money can easily roam the world. 
Rather than directly investing in the production of goods and services, 
corporations make money by placing clever bets (gambling or hedging) on 
interest rate movements, exchange rates, security prices, derivatives, 
commodities and land speculation. The outcomes of such bets could be 
anything from zero (even negative) to several million pounds/dollars and 
depend upon future events, cash flows, volatility and rapid, often 
unpredictable, changes in global markets. In addition, there have been major 
changes in the way banks and financial institutions conduct business. The 
traditional business of lending money to buy property is no longer seen as a 
long-term ‘investment', but as a short-term ‘transaction'.  Rather than waiting 
25-30 years for repayment of secured loans, banks have resold and 
repackaged the original loans many times over. Such transactions are 
underpinned by very few assets and their value is dependent on ever rising 
property values, plentiful supply of money and cheap credit (Morris, 2008; 
Soros, 2008). The dynamics of such markets are only partially understood. 
According to Nick Leeson, the man who brought down Barings bank (Leeson 
and Whitley, 1996), “the regulators, auditors and compliance officials are 
constantly playing catch-up. Their understanding and knowledge of the 
markets and instruments being traded are just not keeping pace” (Daily Mail, 
15 September 200718).   
                                                 
18http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=482060
&in_page_id=1770 
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Transformation of capitalism, market volatility and its consequences for 
auditing practices rarely form any part of professional accounting education 
(Sikka et al., 2007) even though auditors routinely report on businesses 
deeply involved in such markets. Consider the case of Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM), a US based hedge fund that collapsed in 1998 
(Dunbar, 2001). LTCM board of directors included experienced bankers, 
financiers and Professors Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, joint winners of 
the1997 Nobel Prize in Economics. They are also credited with developing the 
‘option pricing theory’, a model that takes account of market volatility to derive 
valuation of complex financial securities (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 
1973). LTCM essentially placed clever bets, or arbitraged, on the price of 
government bonds and corporate securities. It boasted returns of 40% on its 
investment and always received a clean bill of health from its auditors. In 
1998, increased market turbulence due to financial crisis in East Asia and 
Russia made its financial position uncertain and it was bailed out by the US 
Federal Reserve in a $3.6 billion rescue operation. Due to market volatility, 
seemingly solid valuations of financial instruments melt into air. Evidently, 
even Nobel Prize winners in economics had difficulty in gauging market 
turbulence and arrive at an objective valuation of complex financial 
instruments. It is doubtful that auditors are more knowledgeable, or can make 
better assessment of market volatility to verify valuation of complex financial 
instruments.  
 
Some questions about the auditability of financial enterprises are once again 
raised by the current financial crisis emanating from the mortgage lending 
practices by banks and trade in the related complex financial instruments. 
Bear Stearns was America’s fifth largest bank. It accounts for the year to 30 
November 2007 showed net income of $233 million and total assets of 
$397,091 million, compared to earnings of $2,054 million and assets of 
$350,433 million the year before. It boasted a return of 18% on its equity. On 
25 January 2008, the accounts received an unqualified audit report from its 
auditors Deloitte & Touche. However, Bear Stearns soon ran into financial 
difficulties and could not sustain its financial position. The bank was said to be 
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hours from collapse (The Times, 3 April 2008) and support from the US 
Federal Reserve, it was bought by JP Morgan Chase for $2 a share19, valuing 
the bank at around $240 million. Just a few days earlier, the bank had a share 
price of $140 and a market value of $25 billion (The Guardian, 17 March 
2008). 
 
Carlyle Capital Corporation was a thriving AAA rated $22 billion (£11 billion) 
hedge fund, registered in the tax haven of Guernsey. Its parent company 
Carlyle Group had more than $75 billion (£37 billion) under its management. 
On February 27 2008, Carlyle Capital Corporation published its annual 
accounts for the year to December 31 2007. These accounts contained an 
unqualified audit report and were audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers. In the 
middle of major financial crisis, the accounts noted (p. 5) that directors were 
"satisfied that the Group has adequate resources to continue to operate as a 
going concern for the foreseeable future20". It is not unreasonable to assume 
that the available evidence must also have persuaded auditors to corroborate 
the same.  The accounts noted (p. 24) that the company paid $2.5m in fees 
"principally ... to our independent auditors, our external legal counsel, and our 
internal audit service provider21". However, less than two weeks later, in a 
press release on March 9 2008, Carlyle Capital Corporation announced that it 
was discussing its precarious financial position with its lenders. On March 12, 
the company announced that it "has not been able to reach a mutually 
beneficial agreement to stabilize its financing. The Company expects that its 
lenders will promptly take possession of substantially all of the Company’s 
remaining assets22” and was placed in liquidation (also see The Guardian, 14 
March 2008; The Times, 14 March 2008; Washington Post, 14 March 2008).  
 
With mortgaged debts of over $35 billion, Thornburg Mortgage was America's 
second-largest independent mortgage provider. On 27 February 2008, its 
                                                 
19An investor outcry forced JP Morgan to increase the offer to $10 a share (The 
Times, 3 April 2008). 
20http://www.carlylecapitalcorp.com/Financial%20Documents/2007/item10272.pdf 
21http://www.carlylecapitalcorp.com/Financial%20Documents/2007/item10272.pdf 
22http://www.carlylecapitalcorp.com/News/Press%20Releases/2007/item10304.html 
 25
accounts for the year to December 31 2007, audited by KPMG, were 
published. They contained an unqualified audit report even though the 
company was facing large margin calls. On 7 March, a press release by the 
company announced that “it has received a letter dated March 4, 2008, from 
its independent auditor, KPMG LLP, stating that their audit report, dated 
February 27, 2008, on the company's consolidated financial statements as of 
December 31, 2007, and 2006, and for the two-year period ended December 
31, 2007, which is included in the company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for 
2007, should no longer be relied upon. As a result, the company's Board of 
Directors determined that the financial statements for the year ended 
December 31, 2007, should be restated23” (also see New York Times, 7 
March 2008; The Times, 19 March 2008). Subsequently, Thornburg Mortgage 
raised $1.35 billion to manage its immediate crisis (International Herald 
Tribune, 1 April 2008; New York Times, 2 April 2008). Faced with the relative 
worthlessness of audit reports one commentator added that “The life-cycle of 
companies is plummeting … there is no aspect of accountancy or auditing 
even in these troubled times that addresses human talent and managerial 
effectiveness. Audit is totally focused on verifying the numbers. It does not 
seek to measure the things which, as we have just seen, really matter 
because they really make a difference …the conventional audit is probably no 
longer worth paying for” (London Evening Standard, 23 January 200824). 
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This paper has sought to raise some questions about the appropriateness of 
the auditing model, audit quality and the auditability of some transactions and 
businesses. It is common practice for the state to appoint and remunerate 
auditors for health and safety, hygiene, taxes, immigration and many other 
fields. In such arenas, auditors are neither directly selected nor remunerated 
by the auditee. As a result they are independent and are indeed respected 
and often feared. However, neoliberal ideologies limit the role of the state and 
                                                 
23 http://investor.thornburgmortgage.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117476&p=irol-
newsArticle_print&ID=1116530&highlight= 
24 http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23433688 
details/It's+still+the+human+element+that+counts/article.do 
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it is not permitted to directly appoint or remunerate auditors for large 
companies. Instead, companies and their directors select and remunerate 
auditors. Such an auditing model is fundamentally flawed and cannot deliver 
independent or searching audits. The flaws are further compounded by 
permitting auditors to have direct economic interest in corporate transactions 
through the sale of consultancy services. The commercialised auditing firms 
always have to keep an eye on profits and on occasions appease and even 
collude with directors. They have also been willing to violate rules and laws. 
Over the years, attempts have been made to delegate the task of auditor 
selection and remuneration to audit committees and non-executive directors, 
but these are not separate from the company. In any case, many non-
executive directors are dependent on executive directors for their nomination 
and appointment and cannot easily go against the interests of executive 
directors.  
 
The contention of this paper is that the current auditing model is flawed and 
cannot be repaired. One alternative is for the state to appoint auditors of 
major companies.  Following the UK’s Local Authority Finance Act 1982, the 
Audit Commission25, a state body, has appointed and remunerated auditors26 
for hospitals, local authorities and public bodies (McSweeney, 1988; Kelly, 
2003). Auditors are generally banned27 from selling consultancy services to 
audit clients. In addition to financial statements, they also have to report on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the client. The drafters of legislation also 
envisaged a similar arrangement for audits of major companies (Heseltine, 
1987), but this never came to fruition. Such a system could be selectively 
applied to large corporate bodies and was envisaged in the 1930s legislation 
that created the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In the words of 
Lynn Turner, for chief accountant of the SEC: “when the legislation creating 
the SEC was first drafted in the early 1930s, it included a provision making the 
                                                 
25 Its role was extended and consolidated by the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act 1990 and the Audit Commission Act 1998. 
26 These can be private accounting firms or auditors appointed by the state. 
27 They are permitted to prepare information for some statutory returns for 
total fees of £25,000 or less. 
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SEC the auditor for public companies. Then, at the last minute, the legislation 
was changed. …Toward the tail end of the Congressional hearings on the 
Senate side, the head of the New York State Society of Certified Public 
Accountants – who was also the head of Haskin and Sells – now Deloitte 
Touche – went down to Washington and testified and convinced the guys to 
let the CPA firms to do the auditing. The legislation was revised and hence 
the external auditing function that we have today28.” 
 
It is feasible for regulators such as the US Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the UK Financial Services Authority to directly appoint and 
remunerate auditors. The regulators could also have a dedicated workforce of 
auditors focusing on banks, financial institutions and other organisations 
considered to be sensitive to the economy. Instead of annual ex-post audits, 
these auditors could conduct continuous audits and attend not only to 
traditional financial statements, but also to a variety of regulatory matters. 
There will inevitably be resistance to such proposals on ideological grounds, 
or the claims that the state apparatuses are somehow more bureaucratic and 
inefficient. Whilst the proposals may not be a panacea for the problems 
afflicting the auditing industry, at the very least it can give auditors 
independence from company directors and may persuade them to adopt more 
stringent strategies. They can also strengthen regulation of sensitive 
industries. 
 
Overall, little is known about how audits are produced or manufactured within 
auditing firms. The contention of this paper is that organisational value 
systems are a key ingredient of the production of ‘quality’ and should be 
examined. The commercial concerns inform every aspect of auditing. This 
paper has highlighted just two variables which have a bearing on audit quality. 
These relate to time budgets and auditor liability. It is difficult to see how 
                                                 
28 Lynn Turner Says Unless Big Four Change, Bring on SEC as Public Auditor 
21 Corporate Crime Reporter 8, February 14, 2007; available on 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/turner021407.htm (accessed on 24 
March 2008). 
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commercialised auditing firms can ignore either of these concerns. Regulators 
could highlight the impact of these and other variables, but they rarely feature 
in any regulatory report. Public information could help to expose some of the 
predatory organisational values to public scrutiny, but accounting firms publish 
little meaningful information about their culture, operations or relationship with 
company directors. Even if an Audit Commission type of solution (see above) 
is adopted, some concerns with time budgets would remain as no 
organisation could commit itself to an open-ended approach. Nevertheless, 
this need not be constrained by commercial concerns. The liability problems 
would not vanish with the appointment of company auditors by an 
independent public body, as they too could be sued for negligence. Some 
may argue that the likelihood of massive lawsuits would dissuade the state 
from venturing into the auditing market, but public auditors relating to 
customs, taxation, immigration, health and safety, etc., can already be sued 
for negligence and failures, though the claims from audit failure of companies 
may be much larger. In any case, private sector auditing firms have been 
driving down their liability and the equivalent liability obligations could be 
embraced by the state with the added benefit that auditors would be 
independent of audit clients. There may also be benefits in that the regulators 
may gain early insights into the problems afflicting banks and financial 
institutions and may be able to adopt more effective regulatory strategies. 
Hopefully, a vigorous debate would further explore the issues. 
 
Traditionally auditors have relied upon tangible evidence to verify financial 
statements. Such approaches are increasingly problematised by shifts in 
capitalism where money is made through complex financial instruments and 
clever bets. The value of such contracts depends on future uncertain events 
in highly volatile markets. The paper drew attention to major financial 
institutions whose asset values collapsed within days of receiving clean audit 
reports. Perhaps, the time has come to acknowledge that some aspects of 
financial statements can no longer be audited by traditional auditing 
technologies. It may be preferable to provide relevant information to 
stakeholders and invite them to arrive at their own preferred valuations.  Such 
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developments may be resented by auditors whose ‘professional’ and expert 
credentials are based upon the claims that they can somehow construct an 
objective state of business affairs. Inevitably, the future of auditing practices 
will be shaped by power and politics. 
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